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the case where both parameters of heterogeneity are considered. This rules imply a widening of
the education gap between high- and low-ability individuals in second-best with respect to the
￿rst-best gap. The quali￿cations regard the implementation of the optimal allocation of resources
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1 Introduction
Education policy is usually justi￿ed in terms of heterogeneity in learning ability and in
exogenous wealth. The ￿rst parameter a￿ects the e￿ciency of education investments, the
second determines individual resources available for consumption and investment in educa-
tion. Heterogeneity in ability to learn motivates patterns of resources devoted to education
in which the bulk of education resources are allocate to the individuals with the highest
ability to learn in order to maximize the returns from these investments. Heterogeneity
in exogenous wealth motivates patterns in which, on grounds of equality of opportunity,
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1public resources for education are allocated to all individuals regardless of their ability to
pay.
In this paper I address the design of education policies when individuals di￿er in both
of these parameters. A proper consideration of this question requieres the consideration
of other aspects of policy design. The ￿rst of them is the fact that education policy
never appears as an isolated policy instrument. Almost all modern economies have govern-
ments that use other instruments to improve welfare. Probably the most important among
these instruments is the tax code. The second element that must be considered is the
non-linearity of welfare improving policies which is also a characteristic of most observed
policies.
Consequently, in this paper I consider the optimal design of education policies when
the government also sets optimally the income tax code and when taxes are non-linear.
The main issue in this paper is how education policy depends on information available to
a utilitarian government. The main conclusion is that the the second-best allocation of
resources for education di￿ers from the ￿rst-best one in a very similar way when inherited
wealth heterogeneity is considered than when it is not considered. In this respect the
conclusion is the same as in Maldonado (2007): the education gap between high- and low-
ability individuals is wider in the ￿rst- than in the second-best if the education elasticity
of wage function is decreasing in ability. This conclusion has the important implication
that heterogeneity in exogenous wealth does not a￿ect the way education policy di￿ers in
￿rst- and in second-best. Heterogeneity in ability to pay, however, does have implications
on the optimal education policies, it a￿ects the way education policy is implemented.
Traditionally, economists recognize that income taxes have a￿ect labor supply, however,
it also a￿ects education choices. Consequently one cannot look at education subsidies
independently from income taxes. 1 Education taxes or subsidies can be used to reinforce
or reduce the e￿ect of income taxes on education. Thus, depending on whether one wants
to reinforce or reduce this e￿ect one can tax or subsidize education. It is in this respect
that the implementation of the optimal distribution of education subsidies di￿er when the
double heterogeneity is considered from the case when it is not considered. In a two-
class economy where individuals di￿er only in ability, even if ability and education are
complements, low-ability individuals may receive an education subsidy. 2 This will happen
if the education elasticity of wage decreases with ability. This result holds as well when
individuals di￿er in ability and in exogenous wealth as long as the marginal tax rate on
labor income for low-ability individuals is positive. Additionally, in the multidimensional
case, high-ability individuals may face a negative marginal income tax (a subsidy). Under
1. Te e￿ects of income taxes on education choice is quanti￿ed by Bl￿ ondal, Field, and Girouard (2002).
2. The traditional non-distortion at the top result holds in the two-class economy version of this model.
Consequently marginal tax rates on labor income and on education for high-ability individuals are equal to
zero
2the stated condition on the education elasticity of wage, these individuals will also face a
marginal tax on education. Other wise, if low ability individuals face a subsidy on labor
market income the implementation of the optimal allocation of education resources implies
a marginal education tax for low ability individuals and a marginal education subsidy for
high-ability individuals.
Related problems have been analyzed by Arrow (1971), Ulph (1977), Hare and Ulph
(1979), Toumala (1986), De Fraja (2002) and Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). However,
either they make important restrictions on functional forms (particularly on the wage
function) and on the instruments used by the government (for example linear taxes) or
they do not consider the double heterogeneity considered in this paper. This paper, like
Maldonado (2007), departs from these assumptions. In terms of the conclusions the most
important comparison with that of this paper is with Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005), they
argue that the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem holds for the education policy problem. In other
words, education policy has the only role of restoring e￿ciency undoing the e￿ect of income
taxes on education choice. This papers argues that if one allows for a more general wage
function3 the role of education subsidies is to restore e￿ciency only when individuals only
di￿er in exogenous wealth, otherwise, the Atkinson-Stiglitz e￿ciency theorem does not
hold. In this paper I highlight a di￿erent role for education policies. By a￿ecting relative
wages education policy can relax the incentive constraints and make redistribution easier.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
studies the optimal education policies. Section 4 shows numerical simulations of the model
studied in Section 3. The last section concludes.
2 The model and the laissez-faire solution
The model I analyze is an extended version of the one used in Maldonado (2007) which is a
modi￿ed version of the Stiglitz (1982) optimal taxation model. The two main modi￿cations
with respect to these two papers is that the model accounts for investments in education
and for exogenous wealth heterogeneity. This second parameter of heterogeneity does not
a￿ect the bene￿ts from investments in education but do a￿ect the resources available for
consumption and education.
Individuals derive utility directly from consumption and labor supply. Labor market
income and inherited wealth are used to pay for consumption and for the investments in
education. Individuals di￿er in their ability to learn and their inherited wealth. The ￿rst of
these two parameters, together with labor supply and investment in education determine
labor market income. In the absence of government intervention the decision problem of
3. See Maldonado (2007) for a discussion on the existing empirical support of more general wage functions.
3an individual of type i can be expressed as follows:
max
ci;li;qi u(ci) ￿ v
￿
li￿
s.t. qi + ci ￿ ￿i + !(￿i;qi)li
(1)
where u(ci) ￿ v(li) is the utility the individual gets from consumption ci and labor supply
li; labor market income results form the combination of labor supply and investments
on education qi. Individuals di￿er in ability to learn ￿i and ability to pay ￿i. Utility is
increasing in consumption and decreasing in labor supply and labor market productivity,
!, is increasing in both arguments. Utility and labor market productivity are concave in
choice variables.
Throughout this paper I will be interested in the analysis of the general tax function
T(Y i;qi) when it is optimally set by a utilitarian government. Given the tremendous
amount of degrees of freedom that this formula gives to the planner any policy that can
be implemented by the government can be understood with its use. 4 When subject to this
tax function, the problem of individuals becomes
max





s.t. qi + ci ￿ ￿i + Y i ￿ T(Y i;qi)
(2)
where the traditional change of variables in optimal tax literature has been made. The
￿rst order conditions of the individual problem yield the following arbitrage conditions: 5
MRSi
cl = !(￿i;qi)[1 ￿ TY (Y i;qi)]; (3)
MRSi






1 + Tq(Y i;qi)
1 ￿ TY (Y i;qi)
: (5)
4. To see more clearly that this formula can subsume many di￿erent policies note that I am not making
any assumptions about the slope of this formula. Consequently this formula includes the case of linear
subsidies (Tq constant and negative) or the case where education policy takes the form of in kind transfers
(Tq taking in￿nite values in all q except in the education level that the government wants to achieve); for
more details on the relation of non-linear taxation and in-kind transfers see Cremer and Gahvari (1997)
and for more details on the tax function see Maldonado (2007)
5. For simplicity, in these expressions, some abuse of notation is been done. It is well known that the
optimal non-linear tax functions are not di￿erentiable, however, these expressions allow to see the wedge
between the MRS and the MRT introduced by taxes. Introducing the non di￿erentiability at this stage will
only substract to simplicity with out any gain.
4In this expressions MRS and MRT stand for Marginal Rate of Substitution and Marginal
Rate of Transformation, as usual. For the following analysis it is important to note from
(3)-(5) that the MRT between labor supply and investment in education depends on both
marginal tax rates, TY and Tq. These expressions will also be used to understand the
implementation of optimal policies further in this paper.
3 The optimal education policy
Before addressing the optimal design of the tax function T(Y;q) in asymmetric information
conditions, a few words about the optimal policies under ￿rst-best conditions are in order.

















In the ￿rst-best the government directly observes all parameters and decision variables.
Consequently it can set any tax-transfer scheme and faces no restrictions on the policies it
uses to maximize welfare. A utilitarian government would set the tax function T(Y i;qi)
so that all individuals receive the same consumption level regardless of their ability or
their inherited wealth. However low ability individuals would work less and receive less
education than high ability individuals. Moreover, as argued by the second theorem of
welfare economics, the government does not need to introduce any distortions on individual
choices. This means that marginal tax rates (the derivatives of T(Y i;qi)) will be equal
to zero. The balance between labor supply and education investment for each type of
individuals will be set according to the same ￿rst order conditions as in the laissez-faire.
Under asymmetries of information things are di￿erent. As in Maldonado (2007) the
main issue in this paper is the characterization of the function T(Y i;qi) when the govern-
ment has limited information on individuals’ characteristics and choice variables. In this
paper I look for for the quali￿cations that the double heterogeneity imposes on the conclu-
sions obtained in my previous paper. As in most of the optimal non-linear tax literature
this paper adopts the mechanism design approach to characterize T(Y i;qi).
In line with the optimal taxation literature (Stiglitz (1987)) I will assume that the
government observes labor market income Y i = !(￿i;qi) ￿ li but it does not observe
ability, productivity, or labor supply. I will also assume that the government observes
investments in education and consumption level. Inherited wealth is not observed either.
The tax function T(Y i;qi), or the public education system will be characterized for a four










Figure 1: Types of individuals
￿L < ￿H and ￿i 2 f￿L;￿Hg with ￿L < ￿H. Individuals will be labeled according to Figure
1.
As a consequence of asymmetric information the government must rely on direct reve-
lation mechanisms; the Revelation Principle guarantees that there is no loss of generality
associated to this choice and that any optimal indirect mechanism (such as a tax func-
tion) would be equivalent to the direct mechanism. The key element of this analysis is the
incentive constraints that induces truthful revelation. Let ( Ri;Y i;qi) be the second-best
allocation implemented by the planner, where Ri is after-tax income income, Y i is labor
market income and qi is the education investment of an individual of type i. Note that the
allocation only includes variables observable to the government. Asymmetric information
forces the government to design the mechanism
￿
Ri;Y i;qi￿
in order to induce individuals
to self-select themselves through the choice of the allocation designed for their type. This
means the planner will face 12 incentive constraint of the form











The problem of the planner is problem (6) with the additional incentive constraints, (7).
Note that there are twelve incentive constraints restricting the allocations that the govern-
ment can choose.6 Letting ￿ be the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint and ￿ik
6. The technical di￿culties involved in solving multidimensional screening problems are well known. A
general analysis of the mechanism design problem in a multidimensional setting has been done by Armstrong
6the multiplier of the constraint for type-i individuals not to mimic type-k individuals the






























































































￿i + Ri ￿ qi￿
￿ ￿kiu0
￿




and Rochet (1999). The results they derive cannot be applied directly here since the optimal tax problem
requires the introduction of a budget constraint and I am not assuming quasi-linearity of the utility function.
The di￿culty in analyzing the optimization problem in this paper is that if one wants to do the full Kuhn-
Tucker analysis one would have to compare the optimal solutions of the 144 di￿erent optimization problems
that emerge for all the possible combinations of binding incentive constraints. The treatment I give to this
































































￿(￿i;qi) is the education elasticity of the wage function. 7 The expressions for the marginal
tax rates are obtained combining and rearranging (9), (10) and (11). Using the notation
ci = ￿i + Ri ￿ qi, cki = ￿i + Rk ￿ qk, li = Y i ￿




































7. Note that one can see !(￿
i;q
i) as a Mincer equation. Consequently, ￿(￿
i;q
i) corresponds to the
parameter that accompanies years of education in this type of equations. The education literature has
called this parameter the return to education; even if with the speci￿cation adopted in this paper it would
be correct to call ￿(￿
i;q
i) this way, the fact that the term return to education has been widely misused I
prefer to use for ￿(￿
i;q
i) its more direct meaning. I could also call ￿(￿
i;q
i) the growth rate of income with











































Equations (12) and (13) de￿ne the marginal tax rates on Y i and qi. In this case, because
of the impossibility to know which are the binding incentive constraints it is di￿cult to
know a priori the signs of the marginal tax rates (some restrictions on marginal tax rates
are provided in the appendix). However, it is possible to characterize the overall distortion
on education with respect to labor supply.
From equation (13), it can be seen that the key to the analysis of the distortions on
education is the form of ￿(￿i;qi). The direction of the overall distortion on education with



















If this expression is negative the marginal rate of transformation between education and
labor is greater than the inverse of the wage rate; if it is positive is smaller. Notice that for
each individual i the ratio ￿(￿k;qi)
￿
￿(￿i;qi) can take only two values: if the individual is a
low-ability one the ratio can be one or ￿(￿H;qi)
￿
￿(￿L;qi); if it is a high-ability individual
the ratio is one or ￿(￿L;qi)
￿
￿(￿H;qi). According to this, the distortion on education will
be related to whether ￿(￿H;qi) S ￿(￿L;qi). This means that, if distorted at all, individuals
with di￿erent ability parameters will face opposite distortions on education. 8
The e￿ect of the assumptions about the form of !(￿i;qi) on optimal education policy
has already been introduced in Maldonado (2007). The three possible cases analyzed there
are
A1 ￿(￿i;q) increasing in ￿i for all q,
A2 ￿(￿i;q) decreasing in ￿i for all q, and
A3 ￿(￿i;q) is independent of ￿i for all q.
Consider the case in which A1 holds (￿(￿i;q) is increasing in ￿i). Individuals with low-
ability parameter will have MRTi
lq ￿ 1
￿
!(￿L;qi) and individuals with high-ability para-
meter will have MRTi
lq ￿ 1
￿
!(￿H;qi).9 This means that the education level of low-ability
8. By \distorted at all" I mean that for a type- i individual at least one of the multipliers ￿
ki with k being
such that ￿
k 6= ￿
i is di￿erent from zero.
9. I do not use strict inequality to consider also the case in which that type of individual is not distorted.
9individuals will be distorted downwards (if distorted) and that of high-ability individuals
upwards (if distorted). If it is A2 that holds the opposite pattern is found. Similarly,
when ￿(￿L;qi) = ￿(￿H;qi) (14) will be equal to zero and there will be no distortion on the
education level. The presence of a distortion requires that one of the incentive constraints
that links individuals who di￿er in ability binds. If the only binding constraints are those
linking individuals of equal abilities there would be no distortions on education. These
results are summarized in Proposition 1 which restates Proposition 1 in Maldonado (2007)
to take into account the double heterogeneity of individuals considered in this paper.
Proposition 1 Suppose A1 (A2) holds. Consider the low-ability individuals, i.e. i = 1;3.
If ￿2i 6= 0 or ￿4i 6= 0 then type-i individuals will face a downward (upward) distortion on
education with respect to labor supply. Consider the high-ability individuals, i.e. i = 2;4.
If ￿1i 6= 0 or ￿3i 6= 0, then type-i individuals will face an upward (downward) distortion
on education with respect to labor supply. If A3 holds education will not be distorted with
respect to labor supply.
The results in Proposition 1 depend on at least one of the incentive constraints linking
individuals di￿ering in ability binds. If none of the incentive constraints is binding the
solution would be identical to that in the ￿rst-best. If the only incentive constraints that
bind are those linking individuals di￿ering in exogenous wealth, there are no distortions
on education with respect to labor supply. If at least one of the incentive constraints
that link individuals of di￿erent ability binds and @
@￿i￿(￿i;qi) > 0 (A1) the education gap
between high- and low-ability individuals will be widened with respect to the ￿rst-best
e￿cient gap. If @
@￿i￿(￿i;qi) < 0 (A2) holds the same gap will be narrowed. In the case
in which @
@￿i￿(￿i;qi) = 0 (A3) the gap will be kept to its ￿rst-best level. Moreover, if A1
holds the optimal education policies are marginally input-regressive but if A2 holds they
are marginally input-progressive. 10
The reason that explains this result is that the government uses distortions in education
levels to deter mimicking behavior. If the indi￿erence curves of individuals of di￿erent
abilities in the (li;qi) plane are parallel distortions on this plane are useless to separate
individuals. This happens if ￿(￿i;qi) does not depend on ￿i. Note that this is not changed
by the multidimensional heterogeneity since these indi￿erence curves do not depend on ￿i.
However, if ￿(￿i;qi) depends on ￿i distorting education choice becomes useful to separate
individuals of di￿erent types.
Notice the e￿ect of putting together the two parameters of heterogeneity ( ￿i and ￿i).
The bi-dimensional heterogeneity breaks the traditional result of positive marginal tax
10. The results in Proposition 1 can not be extended easily to a more than two-types case. In such a case
any individual di￿erent from the one with the highest or lowest abilities could be mimicked by individuals
with higher and lower abilities making the term 1 ￿
￿(￿k;qi)
￿(￿i;qi) take positive and negative values for a given
individual, and thus making (14) to have an ambiguous sign.
10rates for low-ability individuals and zero marginal tax rates for high-ability ones. Now, the
marginal income tax rate can have negative or positive signs and high-ability individuals
may face non-zero marginal taxes. An analysis of the relations between the marginal tax
rate on labor market income and on education is presented in the appendix. It is interesting
to note here that positive and negative marginal tax rates on labor income can emerge in
this model. Moreover, not always a marginal tax on labor income of a given sign is coupled
with a marginal tax rate on education expenditure of the same sign.
A particularly interesting case emerges if A2 holds. In this case the optimal allocation
is implemented with a positive tax on labor market income and a marginal subsidy on
education for low-ability individuals together with a negative tax on labor income and a
positive tax on education for high-ability individuals. This leads to the possibility of having
something that can be called over-quali￿cation (or under-activity): low-ability individuals
are encouraged to acquire more education than it may be optimal to do in a ￿rst-best
situation. Nevertheless, they may still be asked for lower labor supply than in a ￿rst-best
situation.
As argued before, in Maldonado (2007), I show that if individuals di￿er only in learning
ability, i.e. if ￿3 = ￿4 = 0, ￿1 > 0 and ￿2 > 0, the optimal tax function satis￿es zero
marginal tax rates on labor and education for high ability individuals, a positive marginal
tax rate on labor supply for low ability individuals and that low ability individuals may
receive a marginal tax or subsidy on education
A di￿erent polar case is that in which individuals di￿er only in inherited wealth, i.e.
￿2 = ￿4 = 0 and ￿1 + ￿3 = 1. In the ￿rst-best solution of this problem the planner will
set equal levels of labor supply and education and a lump-sum transfer from type-3 to
type-1 individuals. Since the planner is pure utilitarian it will will want to redistribute
from type-3 to type-1 individuals. This means that there is only one binding constraint:
the one preventing type-3 individuals to mimic type-1 individuals. Consequently among
the Lagrange multipliers of the incentive constraints only ￿31 will di￿er from zero, and the





























11The above expressions imply undistorted choices for type-3 individuals and an upward
distortion on labor supply for type-1 individuals. Consequently the marginal rate on labor
income is zero for type-3 individuals and negative for type-1 individuals. Simultaneously,
there will be a positive marginal tax rate on education equal to the negative of the marginal
income tax so there will be no distortions on education. Thus, there is no e￿ect of the
structure of the returns to labor on optimal education policy. In this case we have that
education should be taxed for high-ability individuals and that the only role for this tax
is to restore e￿ciency in the relation between labor supply and education. The reason for
this is that, since individuals di￿er only in exogenous wealth, indi￿erence curves in the
(li;qi) plane are parallel, thus, there is no use for distortions on education with respect to
labor supply.
Recapping, the main result in this section is that the education gap between high-
and low-ability individuals will be widened or narrowed depending on which of the two
possibilities helps deterring mimicking behavior. If the education elasticity of the wage
function is increasing in ability, mimicking behavior will be deterred by a widening of the
education gap. In the case the education elasticity of the wage function is decreasing in
ability it will be a narrowing of the education gap that will deter mimicking behavior.
The e￿ect of this tax on individual education levels may possibly be reversed using the
marginal tax on education. This is true if the education elasticity of wage decreases with
ability. This rule implies that education of low-ability individuals must be subsidized in
some cases, particularly if they face a positive marginal income tax.
4 Numerical simulations
In this section I show some numerical simulations for the problem stated in (8). The
simulations have three objectives: they shed light to the role of the size-di￿erences between
the parameters, they show some speci￿c cases where it can be seen which of the incentive
constraints are binding, and they show the workings of the qualitative features of the model
previously discussed.
All the simulations share some features, these are the proportion of each type of in-
dividuals and the utility function of consumers. I assume that there are equal numbers
of each type of individual in the economy (￿i = 0:25 for all i 2 f1;2;3;4g) and that the
utility function is
u(c) ￿ v(l) =
p
c ￿ l2:
I show simulations for three di￿erent types of wage functions that were chosen according to
the behavior of their education elasticity with respect to the ability parameter. According
to the theoretical results in the previous sections, this amounts to whether the education
elasticity of the wage function increases, decreases or does not change with the ability
parameter.
12Table 1 shows results for the wage function
!(￿;q) = 10q￿
which satis￿es A1, i.e. ￿(￿;q) is increasing in ￿. Table 2 shows results for the wage function
!(￿;q) = ￿ + q ￿ q2
which satis￿es A2, i.e ￿(￿;q) is decreasing in ￿. Table 3 shows the results for the function
!(￿;q) = 10log(q)
which satis￿es A3. For each of the wage functions I show two di￿erent simulations, in the
￿rst the di￿erence between the exogenous incomes are \small" and in the second one the
di￿erence is \big". For each set of simulations sharing the same wage function the only
thing that changes is the value of ￿H. In each case I report consumption, labor supply, and
education level for the ￿rst- and second-best, additionally I report the marginal tax rates,
the compound e￿ect of both marginal tax rates on education and the binding incentive
constraints for the second-best. 11
Some of the standard features of the optimal income tax problem can be seen in these
tables. Most important, because of the separable utility function in the ￿rst-best consump-
tion is equalized among all types of individuals. However, labor supply and education are
higher for high-ability individuals than for low-ability ones. This causes ￿rst-best alloca-
tions not to be implementable since utility decreases with ability and is independent of
exogenous wealth. Moreover, utility in the ￿rst-best is independent of exogenous income,
which also contributes to the ￿rst-best not being implementable. As a consequence, in the
second-best, consumption must depend on ability and exogenous wealth and distortions
appear in the picture.
In the second-best marginal taxes stop being equal to zero. The tables report the
binding incentive constraints that generate this fact. These patterns of binding incentive
constraints show that the intuitive result of only \downward" incentive constraints and
no bunching that holds in one dimension cases no longer holds when individuals di￿er in
more than one parameter. In all the simulations there is at least one \upward" incentive
constraint that binds.12 Table 3 shows two cases where there is bunching, the upward and
downward incentive constraints that link two given types of individuals bind simultaneously.
11. Quantitative comparisons of the results of sets of simulations with di￿erent wage functions should not
be made here. This explains why the numerical values for the parameters do not coincide, there is no gain
from choosing the same values and, due to computational constraints, there could be considerable costs in
terms of time need to ￿nd interior solutions for each example.
12. Upward incentive constraints are those that avoid an individual with low ability or low exogenous
wealth to mimic an individual with high ability or high exogenous wealth.
13Table 1: Education elasticity increasing in ￿, !(￿;q) = 10q￿
Parameters: ￿L = 5;￿H = 10;￿L = 1
4;￿H = 1
3 (small di￿erence in ￿i)
First-best Second-best
Type c l q c l q TY Tq
1+Tq
1￿TY
1 18.19 0.710 2.148 13.60 0.861 2.605 0.0004 0.049 1.049
2 18.19 1.146 7.462 18.79 1.109 7.107 0.0000 0.000 1.000
3 18.19 0.710 2.148 17.20 0.738 2.265 0.0010 -0.001 1.000
4 18.19 1.146 7.462 21.33 0.968 5.793 0.0050 -0.005 1.000
Binding incentive constraints: 1 ! 3, 2 ! 4 and 4 ! 1
Parameters: ￿L = 5;￿H = 30;￿L = 1
4;￿H = 1
3 (big di￿erence in ￿i)
First-best Second-best
Type c l q c l q TY Tq
1+Tq
1￿TY
1 24.62 0.566 1.587 14.56 0.924 2.510 -0.120 0.297 1.158
2 24.62 0.846 4.738 20.41 1.087 6.896 -0.032 0.032 1.000
3 24.62 0.566 1.587 32.20 0.462 1.213 0.000 0.000 1.000
4 24.62 0.846 4.738 35.79 0.652 3.426 -0.034 -0.011 0.956
Binding incentive constraints: 3 ! 4, 4 ! 1 and 4 ! 2
Table 2: Education elasticity decreasing in ￿, ! (￿;q) = ￿ + q ￿ q2
Parameters: ￿L = 30;￿H = 60;￿L = 100;￿H = 200 (small di￿erence in ￿i)
First-best Second-best
Type c l q c l q TY Tq
1+Tq
1￿TY
1 241.6 1.611 0.190 204.2 1.708 0.211 0.026 -0.038 0.987
2 241.6 1.933 0.241 253.1 1.888 0.235 0.000 0.000 1.000
3 241.6 1.611 0.190 229.0 1.653 0.197 0.001 -0.001 1.000
4 241.6 1.933 0.241 274.2 1.812 0.224 0.002 -0.002 1.000
Binding incentive constraints: 1 ! 3, 2 ! 4 and 4 ! 1
Parameters: ￿L = 30;￿H = 300;￿L = 100;￿H = 200 (Big di￿erence in ￿i)
First-best Second-best
Type c l q c l q TY Tq
1+Tq
1￿TY
1 332.5 1.373 0.136 207.3 1.769 0.232 -0.017 -0.036 0.948
2 332.5 1.647 0.196 269.5 1.892 0.230 -0.034 0.057 1.022
3 332.5 1.373 0.136 410.7 1.235 0.095 0.000 0.000 1.000
4 332.5 1.647 0.196 474.8 1.455 0.143 -0.056 0.096 1.038
Binding incentive constraints: 1 ! 2, 3 ! 4 and 4 ! 1
14Table 3: Education elasticity constant in ￿, !(￿;q) = ￿log(q)
Parameters: ￿L = 30;￿H = 60;￿L = 100;￿H = 120 (small di￿erence in ￿i)
First-best Second-best
Type c l q c l q TY Tq
1+Tq
1￿TY
1 2070 3.163 316.3 1733 3.407 340.7 0.0270 -0.0270 1.000
2 2070 4.084 490.1 2320 3.815 457.9 0.0000 0.0000 1.000
3 2070 3.163 316.3 1763 3.407 340.7 0.0190 -0.0190 1.000
4 2070 4.084 490.1 2337 3.797 455.7 0.0004 -0.0004 1.000
Binding incentive constraints: 1 ! 3, 3 ! 4, 3 ! 1, 4 ! 1 and 4 ! 3
Parameters: ￿L = 30;￿H = 2100;￿L = 100;￿H = 120 (small di￿erence in ￿i)
First-best Second-best
Type c l q c l q TY Tq
1+Tq
1￿TY
1 2725 2.677 267.7 1752 3.527 352.7 -0.007 0.007 1.000
2 2725 3.465 415.9 2447 3.744 449.3 -0.011 0.011 1.000
3 2725 2.677 267.7 3085 2.482 248.2 0.000 0.000 1.000
4 2725 3.465 415.9 3822 2.939 352.7 -0.033 0.033 1.000
Binding incentive constraints: 1 ! 4, 3 ! 1, 3 ! 4, 4 ! 1 and 4 ! 2
With respect to the marginal taxes the main regularity across the tables is that there
is always a type of individuals who is not distorted. It turns out that this is either type-
2 or type-3 individual. This was expected since these are the type of individuals with
bigger and lower marginal rates of substitution. Moreover, when facing a non-zero tax, it
is negative for type-2 individuals and positive for type-3 individuals. This is in line with
the one dimensional cases. In the case where individuals di￿er only in ability, low-ability
individuals face a positive marginal income tax and in the case where they di￿er only in
exogenous wealth low-exogenous wealth individuals face negative marginal income taxes.
Education marginal taxes are in line with what has been argued all along the paper
and particularly with the discussion in the appendix. Low-ability individuals may receive
subsidies on their education expenditure. In all cases at least one low-ability individual
(type-1 or type-3) has Tq < 0. If A2 holds (Table 2), whenever a low-ability individual
faces a positive marginal income tax he also faces a marginal subsidy on education. If A1
holds, a positive marginal income tax can go together with a subsidy or a tax on education
(respectively type-1 and type-3 in top panel of Table 1). When A3 holds (Table 3) marginal
taxes on education are always equal to the marginal tax on labor income.
The education levels and the education gap between high- and low-ability individuals
are also according to the results in the paper. The last column of Table 2 shows that,
15under assumption A2, type-1 individuals face an upward distortion on education and in
the bottom panel type-2 and type-4 individuals face downward distortions on education.
In Table 3 the opposite is found. It is only in Table 3, where ￿(￿;q) does not depend on
￿, that there are no distortions on education with respect to labor supply. Finally note
that the simulation exercises constitute examples not only of policies that can be input-
regressive or input-progressive in marginal terms but also in absolute terms (in the sense of
Arrow, 1971). In Table 1 type-1 individuals have more education than type-3 and type-4
individuals. In Table 3 type-1 individuals have exactly the same level of education than
type-4 individuals.
5 Concluding comments
In this paper I have discussed the design of optimal education policies when income taxation
is also designed optimally and when individuals di￿er in learning ability and in inherited
wealth. I have treated the problem carefully according to insights given by the traditional
theories of welfare economics and of optimal taxation. This meant the introduction of
cash transfers besides education policy and the need of asymmetric information. Also
non-separability of education and labor supply is needed.
In a model where the government observes directly the individual education level, I
have shown that the distortion on the education level may not have the same direction as
the distortion on labor supply. Education subsidies may go together with income taxes.
But this is just one of the possible cases that can emerge in this model. I have shown the
condition under which it emerges, namely, if the education elasticity of the wage function
is decreasing in ability, and it is optimal to set a positive marginal tax on low-ability
individuals these individuals will also face a subsidy on education.
The main purpose of the paper was to contrast the optimal policies that emerge when
the two dimensions of heterogeneity are considered with those that emerge when only one
dimension is considered. The main conclusion is that the result of the di￿erence of the
education gap in ￿rst and second-best is very similar when only heterogeneity in ability
and the double heterogeneity are considered. However, important di￿erences between the
way to implement this education gap emerge between the two models. With respect to
the model where the only dimension of heterogeneity is inherited wealth, the model with
the double heterogeneity shows important di￿erences; in the ￿rst the education gap is
kept to its ￿rst-best level (conditional on the levels of labor supply that do di￿er in both
situations). The consideration of the model where only inherited wealth heterogeneity
is introduced highlights the use of education policy in the models where heterogeneity
in ability is introduced. In the ￿rst the only use for education policy is to restore the
ine￿ciency brought by income taxes on the labor supply-education margin; in the second
one education policy has a real role in redistribution.
16Appendices
1 The marginal tax rates
The speci￿c signs of the marginal tax rates on labor income and on education expenses
are ambiguous in this model because of the multidimensionality assumption that makes
di￿cult to know which of the incentive constraints are binding. However, some restrictions
on the possible marginal tax rates can be obtained.















































Conditions C1 and C2 de￿ne four cases under which di￿erent con￿gurations of mar-
ginal tax rates can appear. Notice that the two conditions di￿er in the presence of the
relative education elasticity of the wage function between the mimicked individual i and
the mimicker k in the second of them. This makes it possible for the left hand side of both
conditions to have di￿erent signs.





. This means that the marginal tax rate on labor supply faced by individual i will
be positive if the left hand side of C1 is strictly greater than zero, it will be negative if it
is strictly less than zero. Similarly, (3) and (5) imply Tq (Y;q) 7 0 depending on whether
￿MRSi
cl￿MRTi
lq 7 1. Which means that marginal tax rates on education will be negative
if the left hand side of C2 is strictly greater than zero, it will be positive if it is strictly
smaller than zero.
Generally the marginal tax rates faced by a type- i individual will be zero when the
corresponding multipliers ￿ki (i.e., the multiplier of the constraint that prevents type- k
individual to mimic a type-i individual) are all zero. Therefore if one of the tax rates is
zero the other one will also be zero. Only in very special cases (depending on ￿ (￿;q)) only
one of the marginal tax rates will be di￿erent from zero.
Table 4 shows the possible pattern of marginal tax rates in each of these cases, it also
labels the cases for further reference. In the table CI(>), CI(<), refers to the left hand
side of conditions C1 or C2 being strictly greater or strictly smaller than zero respectively.
From Proposition 1 and equation (5) it can be seen that if @
@￿￿(￿;q) > 0, Ti
q < ￿Ti
Y for
low-ability individuals and Ti
q > ￿Ti
Y for high-ability individuals. The opposite pattern
17C1(>) C1(<)
C2(>) Case 1: Ti
Y > 0; Ti
q < 0 Case 2: Ti
Y < 0; Ti
q < 0
C2(<) Case 3: Ti
Y > 0; Ti
q > 0 Case 4: Ti
Y < 0; Ti
q > 0








Y < 0 Ti
q 7 0 Ti
q > 0 Ti
q = ￿TY
Ti
Y > 0 Ti
q < 0 Ti
q 7 0 Ti
q = ￿TY
Ti
Y = 0 Ti
q = 0 Ti
q = 0 Ti
q = 0
Table 5: The relation between the marginal tax rates
will be found if @
@￿￿(￿;q) < 0. Assuming @
@￿￿(￿;q) = 0 it will always be that Ti
q = ￿Ti
Y .
Thus, depending on which of these assumptions hold the possible cases that will happen
from Table 4 are restricted. Table 5 shows the resulting possible relations between marginal
tax rates under the di￿erent assumptions on ￿ (￿;q).
Which of these possibilities will be the case is di￿cult to know a priori. This depends
on which of the multipliers of the incentive constraints are di￿erent from zero, on their
size and on the size of the di￿erences between the marginal rates of substitution between
labor and consumption of mimickers and mimicked. The only thing that can be said is
that, if di￿erent from zero, the marginal tax rate on labor income of type-2 individuals
will be non-positive and for type-3 individuals will be non-negative since for the former
the marginal rate of substitution will always be greater or equal to that of its mimickers
whereas for the latter it will always be less or equal.
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